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Being better than others but otherwise 
perfectly normal: Perceptions of 
uniqueness and similarity in close 
relationships 
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‘Free University, Amsterdam 
Abstract 
The current research addresses individuals’ self-generated thoughts regarding their own and others’ 
relationships, examining the ways in which perceptions of uniqueness and similarity are manifested in 
judgments regarding own and others’ responses to dissatisfying incidents. Consistent with the uniqueness bias, 
participants characterized their own relationships by a greater number of constructive responses and a smaller 
number of destructive responses relative to characterizations of others’ relationships. Moreover, external 
raters judged own constructive responses to be more constructive than others’ constructive responses. 
Consistent with the similarity bias, external raters judged items describing others’ responses to be less 
frequently occurring and more extreme than their own responses. Also, this research revealed support for the 
claim that the similarity bias is more pronounced for destructive responses than for constructive responses. A 
recall task corroborated these findings, revealing very good recall for destructive responses enacted by others 
and poor recall for destructive responses enacted by oneself. 
Virtually all relationships eventually are 
confronted with periodic declines in satis- 
faction-declines caused by relatively en- 
during disagreements, conflicts, or unpleas- 
ant events that are external to the 
relationship itself. Individuals may respond 
in a variety of ways to such dissatisfying 
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incidents. Broadly conceived, such re- 
sponses may be construed as either con- 
structive or destructive in that they either 
contribute to the health and vitality of the 
relationship or are harmful to the well-be- 
ing of the relationship (cf. Clark & Reis, 
1988; Holmes & Boon, 1990; Rusbult, 
Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991). 
How do individuals perceive their construc- 
tive and destructive responses to such inci- 
dents? How do individuals think about their 
own reactions in relation to the behavior of 
other individuals? And given that destruc- 
tive responses are potentially detrimental 
to the health and stability of a relationship, 
how do individuals interpret and perhaps 
justify their destructive actions? 
The current research seeks to understand 
the nature of the beliefs that individuals 
hold regarding relationship functioning, 
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examining the nature of individuals’ self- 
generated thoughts regarding their own and 
others’ constructive and destructive re- 
sponses to dissatisfying incidents. On the ba- 
sis of the research regarding social judgment 
and social comparison, we propose that indi- 
viduals’ beliefs regarding their own and oth- 
ers’ relationship functioning will reflect two 
relatively pervasive tendencies: (a) unique- 
ness bias, or a tendency to overestimate 
one’s own uniqueness, exaggerating the su- 
periority of one’s own reactions and behav- 
iors, and (b) similarity bias, or a tendency to 
overestimate the similarity between oneself 
and others, exaggerating the commonness 
or “everydayness” of one’s own reactions 
and behaviors.This framework assumes that 
these two seemingly contradictory be- 
liefs-uniqueness and similarity-coexist 
and that these biases serve the function of 
sustaining the general, self-enhancing belief 
that one is “uniquely better than others but 
otherwise perfectly normal.” 
The current work extends prior research 
in several ways. First, the uniqueness and 
similarity biases are pervasive tendencies 
that have been demonstrated to exist in a 
variety of judgment domains (e.g., in re- 
search on “perceived superiority” and 
“false consensus”; Ross, Greene, & House, 
1. Throughout this article we will employ theconcepts 
of “uniqueness bias” and “similarity bias” to refer to 
beliefs that are also known as “perceived supe- 
riority” (e.g., Wood, 1989) and “false consensus” 
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). While common lan- 
guage would suggest that the uniqueness bias in- 
cludes a tendency to regard oneself as distinctly in- 
ferior to others, it should be clear that this bias is 
defined as the tendency to regard oneself as dis- 
tinctly superior to others. The primary reason for 
employing the concepts of uniqueness bias and simi- 
larity bias is that these concepts (a) explicate the 
contradictory nature of these beliefs, (b) do not 
seem to be domain-specific, and (c) have been em- 
ployed in prior research that has examined simulta- 
neously both beliefs (e.g., Campbell, 1986; Goethals 
et al., 1991). In contrast, the concepts of superiority 
and consensus seem less contradictory and could be 
construed as relatively more domain-specific, with 
superiority primarily applying to attributes that are 
universally appreciated (ability, morality) or uni- 
versally depreciated (e.g., lack of ability, lack of mo- 
rality), and with consensus applying to attributes 
1977; Marks & Miller, 1987; Wood, 1989).* 
However, nearly all studies have focused on 
either the uniqueness bias or the similarity 
bias, thereby largely overlooking the possi- 
bility that by examining such biases in con- 
cert we may illuminate our understanding 
of the nature of self-other perception 
(however, see Campbell, 1986; Marks, 1984; 
McFarland & Miller, 1990). 
Second, prior research on close relation- 
ships has examined issues such as perceived 
(and actual) similarity and uniqueness be- 
tween partners in a relationship (self-other 
perceptions within a relationship; e.g., 
Acitelli, Douvan, & Veroff, 1993; Ross & 
Sicoly, 1979; for a review, see Sillars & Scott, 
1983). However, very few studies have ex- 
amined individuals’ beliefs regarding their 
own functioning in relation to others in- 
volved in other relationships, capturing as- 
pects of self-other perceptions among rela- 
tionships. We suggest that, in addition to the 
uniqueness bias, the similarity bias under- 
lies such perceptions, particularly for those 
responses that are potentially harmful to 
health and vitality of a relationship. If true, 
such self-other perceptions may help un- 
derstand why partners may sometimes per- 
sist in particular types of responses (e.g., a 
reluctance to talk things over), in that they 
may genuinely believe (and to some degree 
overestimate) that their own responses are 
very common, frequently occurring, and 
therefore appropriate (e.g., “Like others, I 
do not talk about every slight problem we 
have”). 
Finally, as noted by Berscheid (1994, p. 
84), “Relationships researchers are begin- 
ning to take advantage of the theoretical 
and empirical fruits of social cognition to 
further their understanding of interpersonal 
relationships. . . . Thus the rapprochement 
that has begun between the fields of social 
cognition and interpersonal relationships 
has the potential to benefit both endeavors.” 
that are not universally appreciated or universally 
depreciated (e.g., opinions and preferences). As 
will be outlined, the current research focuses on a 
domain that presumably includes both types of at- 
tributes. 
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By examining self-other perceptions in the 
context of close relationships, we attempt to 
enhance the linkage between the areas of 
social judgment and close relationships. 
Perceptions of Uniqueness and Similarity 
in Close Relationships 
Past research has consistently revealed that 
individuals are not always accurate and un- 
biased in perceiving social reality, particu- 
larly when this reality has implications for 
the self or close others. One pervasive ten- 
dency has been termed the uniqueness bias 
(Goethals, Messick, & Allison, 1991), in ref- 
erence to the inclination to overestimate 
the superiority of one’s behavior and char- 
acteristics (e.g., perceptions of superiority 
regarding one’s fairness, generosity, and 
ability; Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986; Messick, 
Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Van 
Lange, 1991). An equally pervasive ten- 
dency has been termed the similarity bias, in 
reference to the inclination to overestimate 
the commonness of one’s reactions, opin- 
ions, and beliefs (e.g., judgments of Presi- 
dent Carter’s performance; whether to close 
curtains on winter nights; Goethals, Allison, 
& Frost, 1979; Van der Pligt, 1984). As out- 
lined by Ross et al. (1977, p. 280), “Individu- 
als tend to see their own behavioral choices 
and judgments as relatively common and 
appropriate to existing circumstances, while 
viewing alternative responses as uncom- 
mon, deviant or inappropriate.” While these 
biased perceptions typically have been 
examined in two separate lines of research, 
it seems plausible that both biases-seem- 
ingly contradictory-underlie beliefs re- 
garding one’s own and others’ relationships. 
How can it be that individuals regard them- 
selves as both unique and similar to others? 
A fair amount of evidence suggests that 
it may be functional to maintain a relatively 
favorable view of one’s own actions. As out- 
lined by Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994), 
self-enhancing views may stimulate feelings 
of happiness and contentment, the ability to 
care for and about others, and the capacity 
for creative, productive work. In the con- 
text of relationship functioning, it may be 
adaptive to regard one’s behavior in rela- 
tively favorable terms by viewing one’s own 
actions and responses as quite positive, rea- 
sonable, and appropriate. The prominence 
of such favorable beliefs may promote feel- 
ings of self-worth and happiness, provide 
validation of the quality of one’s relation- 
ship, and enhance perceptions that presum- 
ably are relevant-and perhaps neces- 
sary-to sustaining a relationship (e.g., 
feelings of trust, security, and optimism; 
Holmes & Boon, 1990; Van Lange & Rus- 
bult, 1995). 
From a functional perspective, it has 
been argued that uniqueness and similarity 
biases are differentially functional depend- 
ing on whether the attribute at issue is a 
universally evaluated one (that is, people 
exhibit good agreement about whether the 
attribute is desirable or undesirable) or a 
variably evaluated one (that is, people dis- 
agree about whether the attribute is desir- 
able, and rate their own position on the 
attribute dimension most positively; Sher- 
man, Chassin, Presson, & Agostinelli, 1984). 
For universally evaluated attributes, 
uniqueness and similarity judgments should 
depend on the desirability of one’s own po- 
sition. Individuals should assume unique- 
ness when they regard their standing on the 
attribute dimension as more desirable (e.g., 
“Unlike others, I never lie to my partner”) 
and should assume similarity when they re- 
gard their standing as undesirable (e.g., 
“Like most others, I become irritated when 
I have to wait for my partner”). For variably 
evaluated attributes, individuals should be 
motivated to seek similarity because such 
beliefs provide “consensual validation,” in- 
dicating the appropriateness, “reasonable- 
ness,” and correctness of one’s own position 
(e.g., “Like most other people, we eat din- 
ner around 6:OO P.M.”; Campbell, 1986; 
Goethals et al., 1979). 
With the possible exceptions of individ- 
ual abilities and some opinions, many be- 
haviors and attitudes relevant to under- 
standing ongoing relationships may entail a 
combination of universally and variably 
evaluated attributes. That is, most such be- 
haviors have evaluative meaning (e.g., to 
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sacrifice for the sake of the partner is good), Study 1 
but at the same time, the most extreme form 
of the behavior presumably is not the most 
desirable form (e.g., too much sacrifice is not 
good), and individuals may disagree about 
the specific form of the behavior that is most 
desirable (cf. Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; 
Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 
1997). Accordingly, we assume that re- 
sponses to dissatisfying incidents in relation- 
ships have both a universally evaluated 
component (i.e., behaving constructively is 
better than behaving destructively) and a 
variably evaluated component. 
The above characterization of construc- 
tive and destructive responses to incidents 
of dissatisfaction suggests the functionality 
of both the uniqueness bias and the similar- 
ity bias. First, the uniqueness bias, or the 
tendency to regard one’s responses as more 
constructive and less destructive than those 
of others, resembles perceived superiority 
regarding relationship functioning. Second, 
the similarity bias, or regarding one’s re- 
sponses as common and not extreme or de- 
viant, provides consensual validation for 
the appropriateness of own relationship 
functioning. Third, it seems reasonable to 
assume that relative to constructive re- 
sponses, individuals should feel a stronger 
need to explain or justify their destructive 
responses, in that such responses are poten- 
tially harmful to the health and vitality of a 
relationship and because such responses 
may be discrepant with a favorable image 
of the self (i.e., “I do something that could 
be construed as ‘bad”’). How, then, might 
individuals justify such behavior? We pro- 
pose that individuals tend to justify their 
destructive responses by viewing such re- 
sponses as relatively common and appro- 
priate to existing circumstances, a percep- 
tion that provides validation for the 
correctness or appropriateness of one’s be- 
havior (cf. Goethals et al., 1979; Marks & 
Miller, 1987). Given that there should be a 
stronger motivation to justify one’s destruc- 
tive responses than one’s constructive re- 
sponses, individuals should assume greater 
similarity for their destructive responses 
than for their constructive responses. 
Study 1 examines self-generated thoughts 
regarding one’s own and others’ relation- 
ships, asking participants to list constructive 
and destructive responses that are believed 
to be performed relatively more frequently 
by either self or others. Also, the present 
study asks participants to compare them- 
selves with same-sex others (as opposed to 
nonspecified others in Van Lange & Rus- 
bult, 1995), forcing individuals to relate 
their responses to what is believed to be an 
important reference group in the context of 
close relationships (cf. Buunk & Van 
Yperen, 1991; Peplau, 1983). 
Following the uniqueness bias, we ex- 
pected to replicate the findings of Van 
Lange and Rusbult (1995) and predicted 
that (a) participants will list a greater 
number of constructive responses for their 
own relationships than for others’ relation- 
ships (“being better than others,”cf. positive 
superiority; Hypothesis la); and (b) partici- 
pants will list fewer destructive responses 
for their own relationships than for others’ 
relationships (“being not as bad as others,” 
cf. negative superiority; Hypothesis 1 b). Fi- 
nally, we are interested in exploring possible 
gender effects, particularly the tendency of 
women rather than men to hold a greater 
number of negative beliefs about others’ re- 
lationships,as observed in several studies re- 
ported by Van Lange and Rusbult (1995). 
Method 
Participants. One hundred five individuals 
who were involved in an ongoing relation- 
ship participated in Study 1 (57 women, 47 
men, and 1 individual who failed to indicate 
gender). Participants were recruited at a va- 
riety of locations on the campus of the Free 
University at Amsterdam, including the 
university cafeteria and library. Participants 
were 23.95 years old on average (23.35 for 
women, 24.68 years for men), and their re- 
lationships were an average of 32.46 
months in duration (33.02 for women, 31.79 
months for men). Participants were ran- 
domly assigned to one of two experimental 
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conditions, with approximately equal num- 
bers of women and men in each condition. 
Procedure. The experiment was described 
as a study of romantic relationships. Partici- 
pants were told that the experiment would 
last about 15 minutes, and were assured 
that their individual responses would re- 
main strictly anonymous. Participants were 
asked to list the behaviors that came to 
mind in thinking about responses to inci- 
dents of dissatisfaction in their own and 
others’ relationships. Item Valence was ma- 
nipulated by asking half of the participants 
to list constructive responses and asking the 
other half to list destructive responses. Or- 
der of Tasks was also varied: Half of the 
participants began by listing behaviors that 
they performed more frequently than did 
other individuals, and then listed behaviors 
others enacted more frequently than they 
themselves did; the other half of the partici- 
pants listed “other” behaviors prior to list- 
ing “own” behaviors. In addition, Instruc- 
tional Set was varied: Half of the 
participants listed responses that were 
more characteristic of their own relation- 
ships than that of others’ relationships (i.e., 
focus of comparison was on self, or one’s 
own relationship), and half listed responses 
that were less characteristic of others’ rela- 
tionships than that of their own relation- 
ships (i.e., focus of comparison was on oth- 
ers). The analyses revealed no significant 
main effects or interactions involving Or- 
der of Tasks or Instructional Set, so these 
variables will not be described further. 
In the Constructive Item Valence, Own 
Item Object condition, participants read the 
following instructions: 
Everyone experiences occasional dissatisfying 
incidents in their relationships-times when one 
or the other partner feels unhappy, upset, or 
angry about something (something the other 
said or did, something about the relationship 
itself, etc.). One may respond constructively to 
such situations, that is, respond in ways that are 
helpful to the future of the relationship (e.g., 
talking things over, changing the behavior so as 
to solve the problem), On the next page please 
list as many examples as possible of constructive 
behaviors that you perform more often in your 
relationship than other same-sex individuals do 
in their relationships. Use a new line for each 
response, and describe the behavior briefly 
(maximum of 12 words).2 
Participants were given 4 minutes to list 
behaviors. Following this, participants were 
asked to rank-order the items in terms of 
the degree to which each item exemplified 
the constructive responses that they per- 
form more frequently than do other indi- 
viduals. These ratings were used to identify 
“the best items” for use in Study 2, which 
we describe later. Participants were in- 
structed to rank-order the items by assign- 
ing numbers to each behavior, assigning a 
“1” to the best example, assigning a “2” to 
the second best example, and so on. They 
were asked not to assign the same rank to 
two items (i.e., no ties). Next, participants 
were asked to generate as many examples 
as possible of constructive responses that 
they perform less often than others-the 
Constructive Item Valence, Other Item Ob- 
ject condition. Participants also rank-or- 
dered these items in terms of the degree to 
which each item exemplified the construc- 
tive responses they performed less fre- 
quently than did other individuals. As noted 
earlier, Order of Tasks and Instructional Set 
were counterbalanced across participants. 
In the Destructive Item Valence conditions 
the instructions were identical, except for 
the substitution of “One may respond de- 
structiveZy to such situations, that is, respond 
in ways that are harmful to the future of the 
2. To assist participants in generating items, the in- 
structions employed prompts that paralleled those 
used in research by Van Lange and Rusbult (1995; 
Experiment 1). This research revealed that the 
presence versus absence of such prompts (i.e., a 
comparison of Experiments 1 and 2) did not affect 
(a) the number of items generated, or (b) the per- 
ceived constructiveness of the self-generated items 
in each category. At the same time, we cannot ex- 
clude the possibility that such prompts affect other 
features of the items that participants generated 
(e.g., the extremity and frequency of the re- 
sponses). 
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relationship (e.g., avoiding the problem, 
suggesting ending the relationship).” 
Results and discussion 
The number of items generated by partici- 
pants was analyzed in a 2 (Item Valence: 
Constructive vs. Destructive responses) by 
2 (Item Object: Own vs. Other responses) 
by 2 (Gender of Participant: Women vs. 
Men) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with 
Item Object represented as a within-subject 
variable. Relevant to the predicted positive 
and negative superiority effects, this analy- 
sis revealed a significant interaction of Item 
Valence and Item Object, F(1,lOO) = 28.32, 
p < ,001. Follow-up tests of simple effects 
revealed that (a) individuals listed a greater 
number of constructive responses for them- 
selves, M = 3.26, SD = 1.43, than for others, 
M = 2.78, SD = 1.42; F(1,53) = 4.44, p < 
.05, supporting Hypothesis l a  (i.e., positive 
superiority), and (b) individuals listed 
fewer destructive responses for themselves, 
M = 2.58, SD = 1.49, than for others, A4 = 
3.96, SD = 2.58; F(1,49) = 25 .39 ,~  < .001, 
supporting Hypothesis l b  (i.e., negative su- 
periority). There was also a significant main 
effect of Item Object, F(1,lOO) = 6.94, p < 
.01, with individuals listing a greater 
number of responses for others ( M  = 3.35, 
SD = 1.73) than for themselves ( M  = 2.93, 
SD = 1.49). No other main effects or inter- 
actions were statistically significant. Thus, 
relative to their characterizations of others’ 
relationships, participants characterized 
their own relationship by a greater number 
of constructive items and a smaller number 
of destructive items. This supports the 
uniqueness bias. 
Study 2 
Study 2 is designed to provide preliminary 
evidence relevant to the claim that indi- 
viduals simultaneously exhibit uniqueness 
and similarity biases, and that the similarity 
bias is relatively more pronounced for de- 
structive responses than for constructive re- 
sponses. In Study 2 we employ a random 
selection of self-generated responses from 
Study 1 participants and ask a new set of 
participants to rate the responses in terms 
of constructiveness (ratings relevant to the 
uniqueness bias), as well as frequency and 
extremity (ratings relevant to the similarity 
bias). Moreover, we ask participants 
whether they perform each response more 
or less frequently than others (these judg- 
ments will be referred to as beliefs regard- 
ing self-other prevalence). 
The goal of Study 2 is twofold. First, 
given that participants in Study 2 did not 
generate the items they are asked to rate, 
these participants serve as external and 
blind judges of the constructive and de- 
structive items (i.e., two levels of a factor we 
label Item Valence) generated by Study 1 
participants as typical of self versus others 
(i.e., two levels of a factor we label Item 
Object). Thus, these external judges serve 
to illuminate the nature of the constructive 
and destructive responses ascribed to self 
and others (i.e., for the sake of clarity, we 
refer to these ratings as external judg- 
ments). 
Second, because we examine beliefs re- 
garding self-other prevalence of the re- 
sponses, Study 2 allows us to identify the 
major predictors of such judgments (i.e., 
perceptions of constructiveness/destruc- 
tiveness, frequency, and extremity). Thus, 
these judgments serve to identify what it 
is about constructive and destructive re- 
sponses that leads Study 2 participants to 
conclude whether they themselves or oth- 
ers are more likely to engage in such 
responses (i.e., for the sake of clarity, we 
refer to these ratings as self-relevant judg- 
ments). 
Hypotheses regarding the nature of con- 
structive and destructive responses for  self 
and others. The first goal of Study 2 is to 
assess the nature of the constructive and 
destructive responses for self and others by 
examining “external” judgments of these 
responses. On the basis of the foregoing dis- 
cussion regarding uniqueness and similarity 
biases, we advanced the following hypothe- 
ses. First, consistent with the uniqueness 
bias, we advance two specific predictions: 
Hypothesis l c  predicts that own responses 
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will be rated as more constructive and less 
destructive than other responses; and Hy- 
pothesis Id predicts that constructive re- 
sponses will be rated as more frequently 
performed by the self than by others, 
whereas the opposite should occur for de- 
structive responses. 
Second, on the basis of the similarity 
bias, Hypothesis 2 predicts that own re- 
sponses will be rated as more frequent and 
less extreme than other responses (i.e., a 
main effect of Item Object on ratings of 
frequency and extremity). Third, we pro- 
pose that individuals will assume greater 
similarity for destructive responses than 
for constructive responses. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the tendency to 
rate other responses as less frequent and 
more extreme than own responses will be 
more pronounced for destructive re- 
sponses than for constructive responses 
(i.e., an interaction of Item Valence and 
Item Object for ratings of frequency and 
extremity). 
Finally, we advance one prediction that 
is not directly relevant to the uniqueness 
and similarity biases, but that is relevant to 
the manner in which individuals process in- 
formation about constructive and destruc- 
tive behaviors. Earlier, we assumed that at 
the global level individuals may hold rela- 
tively positive beliefs regarding relation- 
ship functioning, and that destructive re- 
sponses therefore should stand out as more 
extreme and less frequent than constructive 
responses. Accordingly, Hypothesis 4 pre- 
dicts that constructive responses will be 
rated as less extreme and more frequent 
than destructive responses (i.e., a main ef- 
fect of Item Valence for ratings of fre- 
quency and extremity). 
Hypotheses regarding beliefs about 
self-other prevalence. The second goal of 
Study 2 is to examine the extent to which 
perceived constructiveness, frequency, and 
extremity contribute to the prediction of 
beliefs regarding self-other prevalence for 
constructive and destructive responses (i.e., 
these are self-relevant judgments). On the 
basis of the uniqueness bias, we predict that 
perceived constructiveness will contribute 
to predicting self-other prevalence (a pre- 
diction reminiscent of Hypothesis 1); on the 
basis of the similarity bias, we predict that 
perceived frequency and extremity will also 
contribute to predicting self-other preva- 
lence (a prediction reminiscent of Hy- 
pothesis 2). And, on the basis of the asser- 
tion that the similarity bias is relatively 
more important in accounting for 
self-other prevalence regarding destructive 
responses than constructive responses, we 
examine whether levels of perceived fre- 
quency and extremity make greater contri- 
butions to predicting self-other prevalence 
for destructive responses than for construc- 
tive responses (a prediction reminiscent of 
Hypothesis 3). 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-three stu- 
dents at the Free University at Amsterdam 
participated in Study 2 (44 women, 39 men). 
Participants were recruited by means of an 
advertisement placed in a local university 
paper. The advertisement invited individu- 
als who were involved in ongoing dating 
relationships to participate in an experi- 
ment entitled “Interpersonal Relation- 
ships.” Participants were 22.65 years old on 
average (22.27 years for women, 23.08 for 
men), and their relationships were an aver- 
age of 29.68 months in duration (30.14 
months for women, 29.18 months for men). 
Judges were paid 12.50 Dutch guilders for 
participation in Phase 2 (approximately 
$7.00 in American currency). 
Forty items from Study 1 were randomly 
selected from the items that were rank-or- 
dered as “best examples” (i.e., rated as 
number one) by Study 1 participants (10 
items from each experimental condition; 
see Table 1). Study 2 participants made 
judgments of these items on three dimen- 
sions (constructiveness, frequency, and ex- 
tremity). Study 2 employs a 2 (Item Va- 
lence: Items describing constructive vs. 
destructive responses) by 2 (Item Object: 
Responses performed by self vs. others) by 
2 (Gender of Participant: Women vs. men) 
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Table 1. Forty randomly selected responses to dissatisfaction 
Constructive Item ValencefOwn Item Object 
to listen to the partner 
to forgive 
to first carefully listen, and later express your own opinion 
to discuss disagreements 
to laugh about “the problem” 
to consider the partner’s opinion as equally important as your own 
to talk about it, and to attempt to solve it 
to trust one another 
to talk 
to directly ask what is on his or her mind 
Constructive Item Valence/Other Item Object 
to talk and to encourage the partner 
to initiate settling the argument 
to sit around the table, and talk about it 
to clearly express what one feels 
to ask “if there is something I can do” to make the partner feel better about himself or herself 
to relieve the partner 
to tolerate certain irritations about the partner 
to put yourself (and your problems) aside to avoid problems 
to settle the argument 
to be assertive 
Destructive Item Valence/Own Item Object 
to be indifferent 
to pretend nothing has happened 
to say nothing 
to be impatient 
to overgeneralize the problem 
to have too bad a picture of the problem: to exaggerate 
to be cynical or sarcastic 
to not talk about it 
to doubt the current state or quality of the relationship 
to scream without listening to the partner 
Destructive Item Valence/Other Item Object 
to not be willing or able to show understanding 
to hit the partner 
to avoid all problems 
to fight 
to not adjust to the partner 
to avoid each other in some situations 
to be stubborn, to never change one’s own opinion 
to hit each other during fights 
to be jealous 
to keep silent until the partner starts talking 
factorial design. Item Valence and Gender 
are between-participant variables, and Item 
Object is a within-participant variable. 
Procedure. As in Study 1, the instructions 
began with a brief introduction. 
Everyone experiences occasional dissatisfying 
incidents in their relationships-times when one 
or the other partner feels unhappy, upset, or 
angry about something (something the other 
said or did, something about the relationship 
itself, etc.). Individuals may differ in how they 
respond to such situations. In this experiment, 
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we will present a number of such responses, and 
will ask you to make judgments with respect to 
each of these responses, or behaviors. 
The 40 responses listed in Table 1 (these 
responses are translations from Dutch into 
English) were randomly sampled by a non- 
Dutch-speaking individual who was blind to 
the experimental purposes and hypotheses. 
The first 10 randomly selected behaviors 
that fell into each of the four experimental 
conditions were included in Study 2: 10 con- 
structive own responses, 10 constructive 
other responses, 10 destructive own re- 
sponses, and 10 destructive other responses. 
Within each of the four conditions, we sys- 
tematically controlled for gender of writer: 
The first five items in each category were 
generated by men and the latter five items 
were generated by women (see Table 1). 
The order in which the items were listed was 
randomized prior to the judgment tasks. 
Participants were asked to make three 
types of judgment with respect to each of 
the 40 responses. Each judgment was per- 
formed using a 9-point scale. First, to assess 
beliefs regarding self-other prevalence, we 
asked participants to estimate the relative 
frequency with which they perform each 
response in comparison to same-sex others 
(0 = “I do this much less often in my rela- 
tionship than do other same-sex individuals 
in their relationships”; 4 = “I do this about 
as often as do other same-sex individuals in 
their relationships”; 8 = “I do this much 
more often in my relationship than do other 
same-sex individuals in their relation- 
ships”). Second, participants made judg- 
ments with respect to constructiveness ver- 
sus destructiveness. This task was 
introduced as follows: “Behaviors differ in 
the extent to which they positively contrib- 
ute to the future of a relationship (that is, 
constructive behaviors) or are harmful to 
the future of a relationship (that is, destruc- 
tive behaviors)” (0 = “extremely destruc- 
tive,” 4 = “neither destructive nor construc- 
tive,” 8 = “extremely constructive”). 
Judgments of frequency and extrem- 
ity-which were employed to examine the 
similarity bias-deserve some comment be- 
cause the current scales differ from more 
commonly used measures of similarity. Most 
prior research has examined such judg- 
ments by asking participants to estimate the 
percentage of others who would exhibit the 
same (versus different) preference or per- 
form the same (versus different) behavior as 
themselves (this measurement technique is 
most notable in research on “false consen- 
sus”; cf. Ross et al., 1977). Alternatively, such 
judgments have been examined by asking 
individuals to rate their own position along a 
continuous dimension, and then to ascribe a 
position to an individual target person (this 
measurement technique is most notable in 
research on “assumed similarity” or “at- 
tributive projection”; cf. Cameron & Mar- 
garet, 1951; Cronbach, 1955). Although such 
measures have been shown to be valid and 
useful (i.e., such measures exhibit consistent 
patterns across studies), we employed alter- 
native measures so as to examine the Ross et 
al. (1977) claim that individuals tend to re- 
gard their own choices as relatively com- 
mon, while viewing alternative responses as 
uncommon and deviant. Thus, our measures 
assess judgments of how frequently each re- 
sponse occurs in others’ relationships, as 
well as the judged extremity of each re- 
sponse. We employed two measures to tap 
two overlapping but somewhat different ex- 
pressions of similarity. 
Judgments of frequency were obtained 
by asking participants to rate the frequency 
with which each response occurred in oth- 
ers’ relationships, on average (not your own 
relationship). We included the phrase “not 
your own relationship” to discourage par- 
ticipants from basing such judgments on 
their own experience (cf. Alicke & Largo, 
1995). Concrete anchors were included for 
each scale point (0 = “virtually never”; 1 = 
“about once a year”; 2 = “several times a 
year”; 3 = “about once a month”; 4 = “sev- 
eral times a month”; 5 = “about once a 
week”; 6 = “several times a week”; 7 = 
“about once a day”; and 8 = “virtually al- 
ways, several times a day”). Global anchors 
were not employed because such scales 
leave individuals free to employ idiosyn- 
cratic norms or base rates in their fre- 
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quency judgments (e.g., “hitting the part- 
ner” might be judged to occur as frequently 
as “initiate settling the argument” owing to 
the application of idiosyncratic norms).3 
Judgments of extremity were introduced 
by explaining that behaviors may differ in 
the extent to which they are extreme and 
salient: “That is, when you see or hear about 
this behavior, that you find this behavior 
very noticeable and extreme” (0 = “not at 
all extreme or salient”; 4 = “somewhat ex- 
treme or salient”; and 8 = “very extreme or 
salient”). We wanted to soften the poten- 
tially negative connotation of extremity by 
adding the word “salient”; we also assumed 
that the combination of extremity and sali- 
ence captures the meaning of “unusual” or 
“deviant” (i.e., Ross et al., 1977). Words 
such as “appropriate” or “inappropriate” 
were avoided so as to discourage partici- 
pants from coloring such judgments in a 
self-serving manner (i.e., individuals might 
recall their self-other prevalence ratings, 
and extremity judgments might be colored 
by self-presentation concerns). 
Results and discussion 
Our analyses proceeded in two stages. First, 
we examined the nature of the constructive 
and destructive responses generated by 
Study 1 participants as typical of self and 
others (i.e., external judgments). Second, we 
examined the extent to which self-other 
prevalence judgments by Study 2 partici- 
pants can be predicted by their judgments 
of constructiveness, frequency, and extrem- 
ity (i.e., self-relevant judgments). 
The nature of constructive and destructive 
items for self and others (i.e., external judg- 
ments). Participants rated 40 responses in 
terms of self-other prevalence, construc- 
tiveness, frequency, and extremity. Each of 
3. The frequency judgments emphasize how often 
such responses occur in others’ relationships. As 
noted by an anonymous reviewer, such frequency 
judgments can be influenced by both (a) the extent 
to which dissatisfying events occur in others’ rela- 
tionships, and (b) the degree to which each event 
elicits this response. 
these judgments was analyzed in a 2 (Item 
Valence: Constructive vs. Destructive re- 
sponses) by 2 (Item Object: Own vs. Other 
responses) by 2 (Gender: Women vs. Men) 
analysis of variance, with Item Valence and 
Item Object represented as within-partici- 
pant variables. Mean values for each experi- 
mental condition are presented in Table 2. 
For ratings of constructiveness versus de- 
structiveness, we predicted that “own re- 
sponses” would be rated as more construc- 
tive and less destructive than “others’ 
responses” (Hypothesis lc). Indeed, the 
analysis revealed a main effect for Item Ob- 
ject, F(1,79) = 61.36,~ < .001, with own re- 
sponses ( M  = 4.36, SD = .41) being judged 
to be more constructive than other re- 
sponses ( M  = 4.02,SD = .47).However,this 
main effect for Item Object was qualified by 
an interaction of Item Valence and Item Ob- 
ject, F(1,79) = 68.56, p < .001. Follow-up 
tests of simple effects revealed that own 
constructive responses were judged to be 
more constructive than were others’ con- 
structive responses (i.e., positive supe- 
riority), F(1,80) = 133.56,~ < .001, whereas 
one’s own destructive responses were not 
judged to be significantly less destructive 
than others’ destructive responses, F( 131) 
< 1. The analysis also revealed a significant 
main effect of Item Valence, F(1,79) = 
1348.01, p < .001, which reflects the trivial 
finding that constructive responses ( M  = 
6.07, SD = .58) were judged to be more con- 
structive-or less destructive-than were 
destructive responses ( M  = 2.31, SD = .63). 
Finally, there was a significant 3-factor inter- 
action of Item Valence, Item Object, and 
Gender, F( 1,79) = 6.67, p < .02. Follow-up 
tests revealed that, compared to men, 
women tended to exhibit more positive 
judgments of their own constructive, others’ 
constructive, and own destructive responses; 
women and men did not differ in their judg- 
ments of their own destructive responses. 
For ratings of frequency and extremity, we 
anticipated that items describing others’ re- 
sponses would be judged to be less frequent 
and more extreme than items describing 
own responses (Hypothesis 2); we also an- 
ticipated that these tendencies would be 
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Table 2. Number of items, judgments of items, and beliefs regarding self-other prevalence 
as a function of item valence and item object 
Constructive Destructive 
Measure Own Other Own Other 
Constructiveness of Responses 6.44 
(0.65) 
(0.89) 
Extremity of Responses 2.36 
(1.50) 
Self-other Prevalence 5.19 
(0.76) 

























Note: Higher numbers indicate greater number of responses, greater constructiveness of responses, greater fre- 
quency of responses, greater extremity of responses, and greater self-other discrepancy in the frequency with 
which responses are enacted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Degrees of freedom differ somewhat ow- 
ing to missing data for some dependent measures. 
more pronounced for items describing de- 
structive responses than for items describing 
constructive responses (Hypothesis 3). Con- 
sistent with Hypothesis 2, the analyses re- 
vealed a main effect of Item Object for the 
frequency measure, F(1,79) = 176.39, p < 
.001, with own responses ( M  = 3.80, SD = 
72) being judged to be more frequent than 
other responses ( M  = 3.17, SD = .75). Simi- 
larly, the analyses revealed a main effect of 
Item Object for the extremity measure, 
F(1,81) = 81.50, p < .001, with other re- 
sponses ( M  = 3.91,SD = 1.00) being judged 
to be more extreme than own responses ( M  
= 3.46, SD = 1.06). The results were not 
supportive of Hypothesis 3, which would be 
revealed by a significant interaction of Item 
Valence and Item Object. This 2-factor in- 
teraction was significant for frequency judg- 
ments, F(1,79) = 40.17, p < .001, but in a 
manner inconsistent with Hypothesis 3: 
There was a greater discrepancy in fre- 
quency judgments for own versus other con- 
structive responses (discrepancy M = 0.98) 
than for own versus other destructive re- 
sponses (discrepancy M = 0.29). The inter- 
action of Item Valence and Item Object was 
not significant for extremity judgments. 
Finally, we predicted that items describ- 
ing constructive responses would be judged 
to be less extreme and more frequent than 
items describing destructive responses (Hy- 
pothesis 4). The main effect for Item Va- 
lence indeed was significant for judgments 
of frequency, F(1,79) = 184.09,~ < .001, as 
well as for judgments of extremity, F(1,81) 
= 250.89, p < .001. As predicted by Hy- 
pothesis 4, constructive responses ( M  = 
4.25, SD = .79) were judged to be more 
frequent than were destructive responses 
(M = 2.72, SD = .93), and constructive re- 
sponses ( M  = 2.59, SD = 1.36) were judged 
to be less extreme than were destructive 
responses ( M  = 4.78, SD = 1.00). 
For beliefs regarding self-other preva- 
lence, the analysis revealed a main effect of 
Item Valence, F(1,79) = 165.05, p < .001. 
As predicted in Hypothesis Id, in compari- 
son to others, participants believed that 
they exhibited a greater prevalence of con- 
structive responses ( M  = 4.99, SD = .66) 
than destructive responses ( M  = 3.18, SD = 
36). There was also a significant main effect 
of Item Object, F(1,79) = 5 5 . 6 4 , ~  < .001. 
Individuals reported greater self-other 
prevalence for “own responses” ( M  = 4.28, 
SD = .46) than for “others’ responses” ( M  
= 3.89, SD = S1). No other main effects or 
interactions were statistically significant. 
Predicting beliefs regarding self-other 
prevalence (i.e., self-relevant judgments). 
In addition to a main effect of Item Valence, 
the above analyses revealed a robust main 
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effect of Item Object for self-other preva- 
lence, demonstrating that participants 
judged “own responses” to be more charac- 
teristic of themselves than “others’ re- 
sponses.” Own responses were also judged 
to be more constructive, more frequent, and 
less extreme than were others’ responses. 
Thus, the main effect of Item Object for 
self-other prevalence may be accounted for 
by differences between own and others’ re- 
sponses in constructiveness, frequency, 
and/or extremity. We hypothesized that 
judged constructiveness, frequency, and ex- 
tremity would independently contribute to 
predicting beliefs regarding self-other 
prevalence (predictions reminiscent of Hy- 
potheses 1 and 2), and that judged fre- 
quency and extremity would contribute 
more powerfully to predicting self-other 
prevalence for destructive responses than 
for constructive responses (a prediction 
reminiscent of Hypothesis 3). To test these 
hypotheses, we performed a series of corre- 
lational and regression analyses. 
First, for each participant we calculated 
mean values of each measure for each con- 
dition, collapsing across the 10 responses 
within each condition. Then we computed 
the correlations among self-other preva- 
lence, judged constructiveness, judged fre- 
quency, and judged extremity, for each of 
the four categories of behaviors. As can be 
seen in Table 3, reported self-other preva- 
lence was significantly positively correlated 
with judged constructiveness within all four 
experimental conditions. More interest- 
ingly, the correlations of self-other preva- 
lence and judged frequency were marginal 
or nonsignificant for constructive re- 
sponses, whereas these correlations were 
statistically significant for destructive re- 
sponses. Thus, individuals appear to believe 
that destructive responses are more charac- 
teristic of the self to the extent that such 
behaviors occur more frequently. 
Similarly, self-other prevalence was not 
significantly correlated with judged extrem- 
ity for constructive responses, whereas 
these correlations were statistically signifi- 
cant for destructive responses. That is, de- 
structive responses were regarded as more 
characteristic of the self to the extent that 
Table 3. Correlations among self-other prevalence and judged constructiveness, 
frequency, and extremity, as a function of item valence and item object 
Experimental Condition Constructiveness Frequency Extremity 
Own Constructive Items (N = 82) 
Self-other Prevalence .427** 
Constructiveness of Response 
Frequency of Response 
.162+ - .024 
.242* - ,140 
-.091 
Other Constructive Items (N = SO) 
Self-other Prevalence .451** - .031 -.134 
Constructiveness of Response .053 -.159+ 
Frequency of Response ,161 + 
Own Destructive Items ( N  = 79) 
Self-other Prevalence .425** 
Corptructiveness of Response 
Frequency of Response 
Other Destructive Items ( N  = 82) 
Self-other Prevalence .437** 
Constructiveness of Response 




.310** - .260** 
.003 -.428** 
,059 
Note: Statistics are based on 79 to 82 individuals. Sample sizes differ slightly across analyses owing to missing 
data for some measures. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. + p  < .lo, marginal. 
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Table 4. Multiple regression analyses predicting beliefs regarding self-other prevalence 
from perceived constructiveness, frequency, and extremity 
Regression 
Coefficients Overall Regression Model 
t P <  R2 F d f  P< 
Own Constructive Items ( N  = 82) 
Self-other Judgments From: 
Constructiveness 3.93 .001 .19 5.99 3,78 .001 
Frequency 0.62 .540 
Extremity 0.39 ,702 
Other Constructive Items ( N  = SO) 
Self-other Judgments From: 
Constructiveness 4.29 .001 .21 6.70 3,76 ,001 
Frequency -0.43 .667 
Extremity -0.53 .597 
Own Destructive Items (N  = 79) 
Self-other Judgments From: 
Constructiveness 3.47 ,001 .29 10.20 3,75 ,001 
Frequency 3.16 .002 
Extremity -1.51 .136 
Other Destructive Items ( N  = 82) 
Self-other Judgments From: 
Constructiveness 3.69 .001 .30 10.94 3,78 .001 
Frequency 3.31 ,001 
Extremity -1.07 .288 
Note: Statistics are based on 79 to 82 individuals. Sample sizes differ slightly across analyses owing to missing 
data for some measures. 
such behaviors are less extreme. Finally, Ta- 
ble 3 reveals that judgments of construc- 
tiveness, frequency, and extremity were not 
systematically correlated, with the excep- 
tion of a correlation between judged con- 
structiveness and extremity in ratings of de- 
structive responses. Lower levels of judged 
constructiveness were associated with 
greater judged extremity. 
Next, we conducted four simultaneous 
regression analyses in which self-other 
judgments were regressed onto perceived 
constructiveness, frequency, and extremity, 
one regression being conducted for each 
class of responses. As can be seen in Table 
cantly to predicting self-other judgments of 
destructive responses, but did not make a 
significant contribution to predicting 
self-other judgments of constructive re- 
sponse~ .~  However, in none of the catego- 
ries of behaviors did perceived extremity 
contribute to predicting self-other preva- 
4. It is interesting to note that perceived constructive- 
ness, frequency, and extremity accounted for about 
20% of the variance in self-other prevalence rat- 
ings for constructive responses, whereas these per- 
ceptions accounted for about 30% of the variance 
in self-other prevalence ratings for destructive re- 
sponses (see Table 4). Thus, the two-predictor 
model for self-other prevalence of destructive re- 
4, consistent with Hypothesis 1, perceived 
dictor Of judgments Of the beha'- 
iors in each category. More 
perceived frequency contributed signifi- quency and Item Valence. 
sponses (i.e., perceived constructiveness and fre- 
than does the single-predictor model for self-other 
prevalence of constructive responses, a finding ac- 
counted for by the interaction of perceived fre- 
constructiveness is a strong and robust pre- quency) accounts for substantially more variance 
282 
lence judgments. The absence of such ef- Study3 
PA. M. Van Lange et al. 
fects for destructive responses, at least in 
part, may be due to multicollinearity be- 
tween perceived constructiveness and ex- 
tremity, in that extremity exhibited substan- 
tial (negative) correlations with both 
self-other prevalence judgments and per- 
ceived constructiveness of destructive re- 
sponses. These correlations suggest that ex- 
tremity judgments tended to have a 
negative connotation.5 
Thus, consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 
2, self-other prevalence of destructive re- 
sponses can best be understood by taking 
into account the extent to which individu- 
als regard a given response as constructive 
and frequently occurring. However, 
self-other prevalence of constructive re- 
sponses can be parsimoniously predicted 
by level of perceived constructiveness, sup- 
porting Hypothesis 1 but disconfirming 
Hypothesis 2. The overall pattern does pro- 
vide good evidence in support of the claim 
that perceived frequency makes a stronger 
contribution to predicting self-other preva- 
lence regarding destructive responses than 
for constructive responses (Hypothesis 3). 
This finding is consistent with the more 
general proposition that individuals as- 
sume uniqueness for constructive re- 
sponses, and uniqueness and similarity for 
destructive responses. 
5. Finally, we performed simultaneous regression 
analyses for each item in the list, regressing 
self-other prevalence onto perceived constructive- 
ness, frequency, and extremity. The results were in 
agreement with the above findings. In regressions 
predicting self-other prevalence of constructive re- 
sponses, perceived constructiveness exhibited sig- 
nificant regression coefficients in 15 of 20 analyses 
(plus 3 marginal effects), perceived frequency ex- 
hibited significant coefficients in 3 analyses (plus 2 
marginal effects), and perceived extremity exhib- 
ited no significant coefficients (only 1 effect was 
marginal). However, in regressions predicting 
self-other prevalence of destructive responses, per- 
ceived constructiveness exhibited significant coeffi- 
cients in 9 of 20 analyses (plus 2 marginal effects), 
perceived frequency exhibited significant coeffi- 
cients in 12 analyses (plus 1 marginal effect), and 
perceived extremity exhibited significant coeffi- 
cients in 3 analyses (plus 1 marginal effect). 
The goal of Study 3 is to explore individu- 
als’ recall of constructive and destructive 
responses ascribed to self or others by 
Study 1 participants. Such recall is impor- 
tant because it might illuminate the proc- 
esses by which individuals develop and sus- 
tain the general belief that their own 
relationships are better than others’ rela- 
tionships but otherwise perfectly normal. 
Conversely, it is plausible that such (pre- 
sumably stable) beliefs about our own and 
others’ relationships affect the ways in 
which we attend to and ultimately recall 
new information about own and others’ re- 
lationships. Accordingly, we generally ex- 
pected selective recall of information re- 
garding constructive and destructive 
responses that Study 1 participants listed as 
characteristic of their own versus others’ 
relationships. 
Because negative behaviors typically 
tend to receive greater weight and atten- 
tion than do positive behaviors, one might 
assume that these responses will also 
be better recalled. Indeed, some evidence 
supports this reasoning-in particular, 
there is evidence for a tendency to recall 
information that is incongruent with one’s 
general beliefs or expectations (e.g., Hastie 
& Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981). However, evi- 
dence also indicates greater recall of posi- 
tive rather than negative information. Al- 
though several explanations of such 
findings have been advanced, it seems plau- 
sible that positive information may be bet- 
ter recalled because positive information 
presumably is more self-relevant or be- 
cause there are greater possibilities for in- 
terpreting such behavior in light of other 
positive information (e.g., positive informa- 
tion is consistent with a favorable schema 
about the self; cf. Markus, 1977; Taylor, 
1991). 
A recent meta-analysis by Stangor and 
McMillan (1992) suggests the importance 
of several moderating variables, including 
the strength of expectancy and the delay 
between exposure to stimulus and recall 
task. For example, memory €or expectancy- 
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incongruent information tends to be 
greater when the expectancy is weak and 
when the time between exposure and recall 
is small. The current research focuses on 
responses that may be quite common over- 
all. The responses are generated by compa- 
rable participants (i.e., Study 1 partici- 
pants), and participants presumably have 
acquired a fair amount of experience with 
constructive and destructive behavior in re- 
lationships. Moreover, the delay between 
exposure and recall task was small. In light 
of these features of the current research, we 
assume greater recall for information that is 
incongruent with expectations and thus 
propose greater recall for uncommon, in- 
frequent responses than for common, fre- 
quent responses. 
Accordingly, we advanced three hy- 
potheses that parallel earlier predictions 
(i.e., Hypotheses 2 through 4). Specifically, 
assuming that others’ responses are re- 
garded as less common than one’s own re- 
sponses, we predict greater recall for other 
responses than for own responses (i.e., 
paralleling Hypothesis 2, we predict a main 
effect of Item Object). Also, assuming that 
differences in the commonness of own and 
other responses will be more pronounced 
for destructive responses rather than for 
constructive responses, we predict that dif- 
ferences in recall will be relatively more 
pronounced for own destructive responses 
than for others’ destructive responses (i.e., 
paralleling Hypothesis 3, we predict an in- 
teraction of Item Valence and Item Object). 
Finally, assuming that destructive responses 
are less common than constructive re- 
sponses, we predict greater recall for de- 
structive rather than for constructive re- 
sponses (i.e., paralleling Hypothesis 4, we 
predict a main effect of Item Valence). 
Method 
Participants is Study 3 were the same as 
those in Study 2 (i.e., for the sake of clarity, 
we present these as separate studies). After 
Study 2 participants made judgments of the 
responses, we administered a free-recall 
task in which individuals wrote down as 
many responses as they could remember 
from the rating task. As in prior research by 
Liebrand, Messick, and Wolters (1986) the 
instructions read: “During this research you 
have rated 40 responses to incidents of dis- 
satisfaction in relationships. We now ask 
you to write down as many responses as 
you can remember from the list.” Partici- 
pants were given 5 minutes to complete this 
task. As in several other studies (e.g., Lie- 
brand et al., 1986) the lists of recalled be- 
haviors for each participant were catego- 
rized by one of three individuals who were 
blind to the experimental hypotheses and 
goals (i.e., each individual coded roughly 
one-third of the total number of recalled 
responses). The coding was not difficult, be- 
cause the wording of the recalled behaviors 
was generally very similar to the original 
wording. This may be so because partici- 
pants had rated the items several times 
(e.g., judging constructiveness, frequency, 
extremity, and self-other prevalence), and 
because the delay between exposure and 
recall task was small. Accordingly, we did 
not obtain interrater reliability information 
for these ratings (in total, there were more 
than 1,100 recalled responses). 
Results and discussion 
Out of 40 behaviors, participants recalled 
an average of 14.07 behaviors. Recall of 
items was analyzed in a 2 (Item Valence: 
Constructive vs. Destructive responses) by 
2 (Item Object: Self vs. Other behaviors) by 
2 (Gender: Women vs. Men) ANOVA, with 
the former two variables represented as 
within-subject factors. Consistent with Hy- 
pothesis 2, this analysis revealed a main ef- 
fect of Item Object, F(1,81) = 62.2, p < 
.001, indicating greater recall for items de- 
scribing others’ responses ( M  = 8.01, SD = 
2.78) than for those describing own re- 
sponses ( M  = 6.06, SD = 2.39). In addition, 
a main effect of Item Valence, F(1,81) = 
10.67, p < .005, revealed that individuals 
recalled more items describing constructive 
responses (self plus other: M = 7.55, SD = 
2.92) than items describing destructive re- 
sponses (self plus other: M = 6.52, SD = 
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2.52): This finding is inconsistent with Hy- 
pothesis 4, which predicted greater recall 
for destructive items than for constructive 
items (we will consider this matter in the 
Discussion section). 
Moreover, there was a significant inter- 
action of Item Valence and Item Object, 
F(1,81) = 8 . 5 5 , ~  < .005, revealing that par- 
ticipants recalled fewer destructive own re- 
sponses ( M  = 2.57, SD = 1.42) than de- 
structive other responses ( M  = 3.95, SD = 
1.60; a mean difference of 1.38), whereas 
the discrepancy between recall of construc- 
tive own ( M  = 3.49, SD = 1.63) and con- 
structive other responses ( M  = 4.06, SD = 
1.78) was less pronounced (a mean differ- 
ence of 0.57). This interaction is consistent 
with Hypothesis 3, which predicted that dif- 
ferences in recall for own and other re- 
sponses would be more prondunced for de- 
structive responses than for constructive 
responses. 
Finally, an interaction of Gender and 
Item Valence, F(1,81) = 4.37, p < .05, re- 
vealed that the tendency to recall more 
constructive responses than destructive re- 
sponses was greater among women ( M s  = 
7.80 vs. 6.16, SDs = 3.10 and 2.75; a mean 
difference of 1.64) than among men ( M s  = 
7.28 vs. 6.92, SDs = 2.71 and 2.19; a mean 
difference of 0.36). One may speculate that 
women more than men recall constructive 
responses because women are somewhat 
more likely than men to engage in construc- 
tive problem-solving in ongoing relation- 
ships (cf. Rusbult, Johnson, & Morrow, 
1986; Sprecher, 1992). Accordingly, con- 
structive responses may be more self-de- 
scriptive for women than for men. 
To summarize, recall was greater for (a) 
constructive responses than for destructive 
responses, and (b) for items listed by Study 
1 participants as characteristic of others in 
their relationships (i-e., other responses), 
rather than items listed by Study 1 partici- 
pants as characteristic of the self in their 
own relationships (i.e., own responses). 
Most importantly, others’ destructive re- 
sponses were recalled much better than 
one’s own destructive responses, whereas 
differences between one’s own and others’ 
constructive responses were relatively 
small. This latter finding is congruent with 
the broader claim that others’ responses 
(destructive responses in particular) are un- 
common and infrequent (and therefore 
memorable), whereas one’s own destruc- 
tive responses are more common and fre- 
quent (and therefore less memorable). 
General Discussion 
The current research provides good evi- 
dence in support of the claim that percep- 
tions of uniqueness and similarity underlie 
individuals’ beliefs regarding their re- 
sponses to incidents of dissatisfaction. Rele- 
vant to hypotheses involving the unique- 
ness bias, we found support for four specific 
predictions. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 a 
and lb, participants listed a greater number 
of constructive responses and fewer de- 
structive responses in describing them- 
selves than in describing others. Consistent 
with Hypothesis lc, although destructive 
items describing oneself were not rated as 
more destructive than destructive items de- 
scribing others, constructive items describ- 
ing oneself were rated as more constructive 
than were constructive items describing 
others. And in support of Hypothesis Id, 
constructive items were rated as more fre- 
quently performed by oneself than by oth- 
ers, whereas the opposite was observed for 
destructive items. 
Consistent with the similarity bias (i.e., 
Hypothesis 2), items describing responses 
of oneself were rated as more frequent and 
less extreme than were items describing 
others’ responses. Also, responses describ- 
ing others were better recalled than were 
items describing one’s own responses. And 
congruent with Hypothesis 3, ratings of 
constructiveness were the only solid predic- 
tor of beliefs regarding self-other preva- 
lence of constructive responses, whereas 
ratings of constructiveness and ratings of 
frequency were significant predictors of be- 
liefs regarding self-other prevalence of de- 
structive responses. Finally, the current 
work provides partial evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 4. As predicted, constructive 
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responses were rated as more frequent and 
less extreme than were destructive re- 
sponses. However, inconsistent with Hy- 
pothesis 4, constructive responses were bet- 
ter recalled than were destructive 
responses. Below, we briefly consider spe- 
cific findings in light of underlying mecha- 
nisms and alternative explanations, and we 
review the theoretical and practical impli- 
cations of the results. 
How do we account for the simultaneous 
occurrence of the uniqueness and similarity 
biases? To begin with, we propose that at 
least in part, these biases can be understood 
by reference to the manner in which indi- 
viduals process information about their 
own and others’ relationships. In processing 
information regarding others’ relationships, 
individuals may focus on specific informa- 
tion that is largely negative rather than 
positive (Le., the negativity effect) and may 
focus on information that is infrequent or 
extreme rather than common (i.e., the ex- 
tremity effect; e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 
1989). Such information processing may re- 
sult in a greater availability of destructive 
and extreme responses for other individu- 
als. The finding that a relatively large 
number of destructive responses were gen- 
erated and recalled for others is consistent 
with this reasoning. Moreover, findings re- 
garding self-other prevalence suggest that 
there is a fair amount of agreement about 
the types of responses that characterize 
others, but not oneself. 
Although the negativity and extremity 
effects presumably are pervasive, we pro- 
pose that in the processing of information 
regarding one’s own relationship, such ten- 
dencies may be overshadowed by cognitive 
filters that serve to sustain or improve a 
relatively favorable image of one’s relation- 
ship. Most individuals presumably have de- 
veloped fairly positive self-schemata, rela- 
tively stable and favorable beliefs about the 
self, which guide the processing of incoming 
information (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Through such filters, information indicative 
of the positivity or appropriateness of one’s 
responses may be welcomed, whereas infor- 
mation suggesting the negativity or inap- 
propriateness of one’s responses may be 
softened or denied. Given that such infor- 
mation concerns the self, the individual’s 
ability to filter in such a manner is facili- 
tated by the possession of knowledge re- 
garding internal processes (e.g., underlying 
intentions, effort expenditure) and prior be- 
havior (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). That is, 
whereas one’s negative or extreme re- 
sponses may be viewed in light of benign 
intentions or may be linked to positive re- 
sponses in the past, such tendencies are less 
feasible in processing information regard- 
ing others’ responses. 
Are there alternative mechanisms that 
may help to explain the uniqueness and 
similarity biases observed in the current re- 
search? The availability of destructive re- 
sponses enacted by others could be guided 
by preexisting stereotypes that come to 
mind when thinking about destructive re- 
sponses (i.e., beliefs regarding a specific 
group of real or imaginary others who be- 
have quite destructively during incidents of 
dissatisfaction; cf. Weinstein, 1980). Such 
stereotypes may be further stimulated by 
information conveyed via the mass media 
(e.g., TV talk shows, soap operas), which 
tend to focus on individuals who engage in 
rather negative and otherwise uncommon 
behaviors. In addition to stereotypes, it may 
also be that individuals intentionally focus 
on others who enact destructive and ex- 
treme responses (cf. downward comparison; 
Wills, 1991) or focus on specific domains of 
responses that allow them to maintain a 
relatively favorable image of their own re- 
sponses (cf. dimensional comparison, 
Wood, 1989). 
Moreover, Study 2 revealed some evi- 
dence in support of the claim that individu- 
als assume greater similarity for destructive 
than for constructive responses (Hypothe- 
sis 3).  In particular, correlational and re- 
gression analyses revealed that perceived 
constructiveness alone suffices in predict- 
ing beliefs regarding self-other prevalence 
of constructive responses, whereas both 
perceived constructiveness and frequency 
make unique and substantial contributions 
toward predicting beliefs regarding 
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self-other prevalence of destructive re- 
sponses. This finding suggests that individu- 
als justify or discount their own destructive 
behaviors by believing that such responses 
are common and occur frequently in oth- 
ers’ relationships as well, thereby underlin- 
ing the appropriateness and reasonableness 
of such undesirable behaviors (cf. Camp- 
bell, 1986; Goethals, 1986; Sherman et al., 
1984). In contrast, the destructive responses 
typical of others are perceived as infre- 
quent (and extreme); such views may be 
strengthened by some of the specific 
mechanisms outlined above (e.g., the ex- 
tremity effect, stereotype salience, down- 
ward comparison, and dimensional com- 
parison). 
It is conceivable that, in addition to con- 
sensual validation, alternative mechanisms 
assumed to underlie the similarity bias can 
account for some of the current find- 
ings-the general occurrence of the similar- 
ity bias could follow from selective expo- 
sure, cognitive availability, focus of 
attention, and situational attribution (cf. 
Marks & Miller, 1987). However, the tradi- 
tional formulations of such processes seem 
less capable of explaining (a) why the simi- 
larity and extremity biases coexist, and (b) 
why the similarity bias is relatively more 
pronounced for destructive responses. Nev- 
ertheless, these processes may be valid in 
the context of constructive and destructive 
responses in relationships, if one no longer 
assumes that these mechanisms necessarily 
lead to assumed similarity. Specifically, indi- 
viduals may be selectively exposed to infor- 
mation about responses of others that are 
negative and otherwise extreme (e.g., selec- 
tive exposure through mass media influ- 
ences); instances of destructive responses 
enacted by others may come to mind rela- 
tively easily (i.e., cognitive availability does 
not necessarily imply that instances of simi- 
lar responses are most salient); a focus on 
self could also serve as an anchor with 
which information about others is to be 
contrasted (i.e., noticing self-enhancing dif- 
ferences in addition to similarities); and, fi- 
nally, situational attributions could be made 
in a self-enhancing manner (e.g., justifying 
own destructive responses and viewing 
them as fairly appropriate) or could be less 
feasible in interpreting others’ responses 
(e.g., information regarding the context in 
which others’ destructive and constructive 
responses take place may be limited). 
Finally, Study 3 revealed greater recall 
for others’ responses than for one’s own re- 
sponses, along with greater recall for one’s 
own constructive responses than for one’s 
own destructive responses. In accounting 
for these findings, it is useful to assume that 
several specific mechanisms may underlie 
recall abilities (cf. Stangor & McMillan, 
1992). First, greater recall for others’ re- 
sponses than for one’s own responses may 
be attributed to the fact that others’ re- 
sponses were rated as relatively less com- 
mon and more extreme (cf. Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989). However, recall also may 
have been influenced by individuals’ glob- 
ally benign views of relationship function- 
ing, such that individuals remember those 
responses that are congruent with global ex- 
pectations and beliefs (cf. Markus, 1977; 
Stangor & McMillan, 1992). In particular, 
this mechanism may account for the finding 
that individuals recalled a moderate 
number of their own constructive responses. 
Do those two mechanisms account for the 
finding that others’ constructive behaviors 
were recalled at a level similar to that ob- 
served for one’s own constructive behaviors 
or for others’ destructive behaviors? 
Perhaps recall is also influenced by a so- 
cial comparison activity that has been 
termed self-improvement, in reference to 
the tendency to compare oneself to others 
who teach one how to perform better or 
who motivate one to improve (cf. Wood, 
1989). Participants may have assigned 
greater attention to others’ constructive re- 
sponses because doing so would teach them 
how to deal with future incidents of dissat- 
isfaction. The poor recall of one’s own de- 
structive responses may be explained by 
the fact that-relative to others’ destructive 
responses-these responses were viewed as 
common and somewhat self-descriptive. 
Accordingly, these responses may be easily 
forgotten because they do not stand out as 
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exceptional or uncommon and because 
these somewhat self-descriptive responses 
are inconsistent with positive self-sche- 
mata. Finally, inspection of Table 1 suggests 
that there may be somewhat more overlap 
among the destructive responses (e.g., ag- 
gressive acts, ignoring the problem) than 
among the constructive responses, which 
may have reduced individuals’ ability to re- 
call destructive responses. 
Two final issues deserve some brief dis- 
cussion. First, consistent with predictions, 
destructive responses were rated as less fre- 
quent and more extreme than were con- 
structive responses. This finding provides 
evidence in support of the basic assump- 
tions underlying negativity and extremity 
effects (e.g., Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skow- 
ronski & Carlston, 1989), and demonstrates 
their robustness in the context of relation- 
ships. Second, throughout this article we 
employed the term “bias” to describe per- 
ceptions of uniqueness and similarity. How- 
ever, most of the obtained findings can in 
fact be explained by assuming that indi- 
viduals form and maintain fairly accurate 
beliefs (cf. Colvin & Block, 1994; Dawes, 
1989). For example, it is not necessarily er- 
roneous for most individuals to believe that 
they “hit the partner” less frequently than 
did others, assuming that some small minor- 
ity of people hit their partners; assuming 
this to be the case, most people may accu- 
rately claim that they engage in such de- 
structive responses less frequently than do 
others. An interesting implication following 
from this line of reasoning is that individu- 
als may maintain relatively benign views of 
their relationships while simultaneously be- 
ing fairly accurate. At least in part, incom- 
ing information concerning relatively un- 
common and extreme forms of destructive 
behaviors may help individuals to maintain 
a feeling of superiority, whereas informa- 
tion concerning more ordinary or common 
forms of destructive behaviors may provide 
consensual validation for their own de- 
structive responses. A potential threat to 
the well-being of relationships is that indi- 
viduals may soften or to some degree “dis- 
count” their own destructive responses 
(e.g., other partners do exactly the same), 
whereas their partners are less likely to sof- 
ten or discount such responses. A conceiv- 
able result of such discrepant interpreta- 
tions is a metaconflict, or conflict regarding 
the conflict process itself, which may fur- 
ther contribute to the dissatisfaction. In- 
deed, metaconflicts have been argued to be 
an important source of contention and 
stress in close relationships (cf. Braiker & 
Kelley, 1979). 
We wish to outline briefly some 
strengths and limitations of the current re- 
search. First, one limitation is that the cur- 
rent work provides little insight into pre- 
cisely how and why individuals assume 
both uniqueness and similarity in their re- 
sponses to dissatisfaction. Clearly, further 
research is needed to examine directly the 
roles of information-processing styles (e.g., 
in regard to the negativity and extremity 
effects as well as several social comparison 
activities). Also, we cannot rule out alterna- 
tive explanations that emphasize the roles 
of person positivity (e.g., the self-as-a-per- 
son is compared to “a group” of same-sex 
others; cf. Sears, 1983) and social desirabil- 
ity. However, social desirability is unlikely 
to play an exceptionally important role, in 
that recent research has revealed that ten- 
dencies toward perceived superiority are 
not correlated with instruments assessing 
tendencies toward socially desirable re- 
sponding (Rusbult, Van Lange, Verette, & 
Yovetich, 1996). 
Second, the direction of causality be- 
tween beliefs regarding self-other preva- 
lence and perceived constructiveness and 
frequency is not clear. For example, do we 
believe that we perform destructive re- 
sponses less frequently than do others be- 
cause such behaviors are destructive and 
uncommon, or do we believe that such re- 
sponses are destructive and uncommon be- 
cause we do not perform such behaviors as 
frequently as others? Third, we have as- 
sumed that responses to dissatisfaction in- 
volve both universally and variably evalu- 
ated dimensions. While this assumption 
seems plausible, this claim remained un- 
tested in the current research. 
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Finally, our method of measuring simi- 
larity bias is somewhat unusual, and the ab- 
sence of more commonly used measures 
does not facilitate careful comparison with 
prior work on similarity. Moreover, the fre- 
quency judgments may be guided by (a) the 
frequency with which dissatisfying events 
occur, and (b) the extent to which partici- 
pants believe that others responded con- 
structively or destructively to a given dissat- 
isfying event (see note 3) .  At the same time, 
we believe that research on the similarity 
bias may profit from less commonly used 
operationalizations that focus on individu- 
als’ perceptions of commonness, deviance, 
and appropriateness-constructs delineat- 
ing judgments that are central in the Ross 
et al. (1977) definition of “false consensus.” 
One important strength of the current 
research concerns the multifaceted meth- 
odology that included the generation of 
items (Study l ) ,  judgment of items (Study 
2), and recall of items (Study 3) describing 
constructive and destructive responses be- 
lieved to be performed by oneself or others. 
One advantage of this approach is that such 
items are more likely to be central to indi- 
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